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THE STATE, THE TRIBE, AND THE UGLY: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STAKES A BAD CLAIM ON INDIAN LAND FOR TRIBAL CIVIL
JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS IN WINDOW ROCK
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. REEVES
TYLER L. MURPHY*
“Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?”1
I. THE WILD WEST OF TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION: AN INTRODUCTION
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN STATES AND TRIBES OVER NONMEMBERS

TO

Within the borders of the United States, many Americans expect their
fundamental rights to be protected from unwarranted government intrusion; however, there are some places within the country where this is not
true.2 On Indian reservations, tribal governments are not beholden to the
United States Constitution nor are its courts subject to Supreme Court
review.3 To protect nonmember citizens, federal courts have made concerted efforts to limit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.4 However, in
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. 2016, Binghamton University. This Note is dedicated to my father and fellow
Villanova Wildcat, Kyle Murphy, as well as to my mother, Elizabeth Murphy, my
sister, Madison Murphy, and my brother, Jackson Murphy. Without all of their
unwavering love and support, none of this would have been possible. Finally, I
would like to thank the staff of the Villanova Law Review for their thoughtful
feedback and giving me the opportunity to publish this Note.
1. ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 101 (Marcus Dods trans., Hendrickson Publishers 2009) (426 AD).
2. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 382–85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)
(explaining Americans’ constitutional rights are not protected on reservations); see
also Mathew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 779, 821–22 (2014) (noting concern for lack of constitutional safeguards for
nonmembers on reservations).
3. See Mathew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U.
COLO. L. REV. 973, 974 (2010) (discussing that United States Constitution does not
bind tribal governments); see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 821 (stating that the
United States Constitution does not apply to tribes); cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012)
(codifying Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 in an attempt to influence tribal courts
to conform to U.S. Constitution). Compare Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008) (commenting that nonmembers lack
constitutional protections because the United States Constitution does not apply
to tribal governments or tribal courts), with Hicks, 533 U.S. at 382–85 (outlining
which protections not afforded to nonmembers in tribal courts).
4. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Reempowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 471–85 (2005) (describing how Supreme Court
initially limited tribal jurisdiction); see also Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047,
1057–60 (explaining steps taken by Supreme Court limiting tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers). See generally Hicks, 533 U.S. at 382–85 (citing concerns federal
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June of 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
proposed a new tribal jurisdictional framework that turns on the ownership status of land and grants tribes sweeping power to assert civil jurisdiction over nonmembers in Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves.5
The Supreme Court has held that states presumptively have jurisdiction over nonmembers, but the Court has not definitively stated if this
presumption applies to nonmember conduct on Indian-owned land.6 The
Supreme Court has maintained that tribes retain exclusive authority
within their own borders to create and enforce tribal law that conforms to
their tribal customs.7 However, the Court has also developed frameworks
that restrict this power when nonmember conduct occurs on nonmemberfee land within the reservation.8 Circuit courts have held that ownership
of land does not automatically grant tribes civil jurisdiction over nonmembers and therefore, jurisdiction generally falls to the state that the reservation resides in.9
courts have regarding tribes asserting civil jurisdiction over nonmembers). For a
further discussion of how the Supreme Court has limited tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers, see infra notes 27–62 and accompanying text.
5. 861 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2017) (outlining new jurisdictional framework
for tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers), amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis
14253 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018). The Ninth circuit
later amended its decision in Reeves to delete a footnote regarding the extent that
the state of Arizona can operate public schools within tribal reservations, but the
amendment did not alter the court’s analysis. See Reeves, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis
14253, at *2 (explaining court’s amendment).
6. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 780 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court
has not ruled definitively in this area concerning tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers arising on tribally owned land). Fletcher also predicts that if the Supreme Court were to definitively rule on this jurisdictional issue, the Court would
likely find that tribes are extremely restricted in exercising civil jurisdiction over
nonmember conduct on tribal land based on the trend of recent Supreme Court
precedent. See id.
7. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (stating that tribes may make
and enforce their own laws); see also Neil G. Westeson, From Montana to Plains
Commerce Bank and Beyond: The Supreme Court’s View of Tribal Jurisdiction over NonMembers, in OIL AND GAS AGREEMENTS: MIDSTREAM AND MARKETING, Ch. 9-1 (Rocky
Mt. Min. L. Inst. eds., 2011) (discussing retained sovereignty of tribes). Tribes
retained the right of self-government, which was first recognized in 1831. See id.
8. See Judith V. Royster, Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal Authority over Nonmembers on Trust Lands, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 890–91 (2015) (recognizing confusion over whether tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers).
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks, lower courts have had difficulty determining whether the Supreme Court held that tribes have civil jurisdiction over
nonmember conduct on tribal land. See id. at 891 (explaining confusion over tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers); see also infra notes 56–62 for an in-depth
discussion of Hicks.
9. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 917–18 (Christen, J., dissenting) (noting other circuits have not found ownership of land automatically determinative of tribal jurisdiction). For a further discussion of how other circuits have analyzed whether a
tribe can assert jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned
land, see infra notes 69–96 and accompanying text.
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This jurisdictional confusion over nonmembers has hurt tribes economically.10 There are an estimated fifteen million acres of land with untapped energy resources on tribal lands ripe for economic investment.11
Nevertheless, tribal reservations continue to be some of the poorest areas
in the United States with one in four Native Americans living in poverty.12
Nonmembers avoid investing on reservations out of fear of being hailed
into tribal court, which in turn forces tribal members to seek employment
far from the borders of their reservation.13 Conversely, some nonmembers take advantage of this confusion and intentionally act recklessly on
Indian-owned land, knowing that it is difficult for tribes to assert jurisdiction over them.14
In Reeves, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a tribal court had jurisdiction to hear civil claims that former employees brought against state
public schools operating on leased tribal land.15 The court relied on the
10. See, e.g., Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167,
169 (5th Cir. 2014) (describing nonmember tortious conduct on reservation).
The facts of this case concerned an act of sexual violence against a nonmember.
See id.; see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 782 (listing abhorrent conduct committed
by nonmembers on tribal reservations). Fletcher argues that this conduct will
likely continue due to a lack of intervention by Congress. See Fletcher, supra note
2, at 782.
11. See, e.g., Westeson, supra note 7, at Ch. 9-1 (describing vast energy resources on Indian reservations in the United States). Nonmembers have tapped
into some of these resources but there is still potential for them to invest more into
reservations. See id. (discussing potential nonmember investment opportunities in
tribal reservations).
12. See, e.g., Jens Manuel Krogstad, One-in-Four Native Americans and Alaska Natives Are Living in Poverty, PEW RES. CTR. (June 13, 2014), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/13/1-in-4-native-americans-and-alaskanatives-are-living-in-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/C7TL-R5BS] (analyzing poverty
rates of Native Americans in the United States). One Native American tribe’s poverty rate was triple the national average. See id.
13. See Robert J. Miller, Creating Economic Development on Indian Reservations,
PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.perc.org/articles/creatingeconomic-development-indian-reservations [https://perma.cc/6NEX-BRVP] (explaining nonmembers fear that tribal governments will fail to protect any nonmember business or asset located within reservation); see also John Koppisch,
Opinion, Why are Indian Reservations So Poor? A Look at the Bottom 1%, FORBES (Dec.
13, 2011, 07:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoppisch/2011/12/13/
why-are-indian-reservations-so-poor-a-look-at-the-bottom-1/#36a7b7133c07
[https://perma.cc/KD9W-VDSF] (explaining that nonmembers avoid opening
businesses within Indian reservations due to fear of falling under the jurisdiction
of tribal courts).
14. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1002–03 (explaining incentive that nonmembers have to act recklessly on tribal reservation). Because tribal courts typically
lack jurisdiction over nonmembers and the federal government lacks the necessary
resources to exercise authority over nonmembers on tribal land, nonmembers are
more likely to behave recklessly within Indian reservations due to this lack of governance. See id.
15. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir.
2017) (discussing issue before the court), amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14253
(9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018). This case was on appeal
from a district court in Arizona. See id. at 897.
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Supreme Court’s decisions in Montana v. United States16 and Nevada v.
Hicks.17 Based on its interpretation of these cases, the court held that
tribes are presumed to have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers when nonmember conduct occurs on Indian-owned land, unless state law enforcement interests are at stake.18 In Reeves, there were no state law
enforcement interests present.19 Thus, the tribal court’s jurisdictional
claim over nonmembers was at least plausible and the claim continued to
be heard in the tribal court system.20
This Note analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Reeves and finds its
proposed framework for tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers unworkable because it ultimately hurts all parties involved.21 This Note also advocates for federal review of tribal court decisions involving nonmembers
and the adoption of the federal personal jurisdiction doctrine for tribal
civil jurisdiction analyses.22 Part II explains how the Supreme Court has
16. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
17. 533 U.S. 353 (2001); see also Reeves, 861 F.3d at 898 (recognizing the major
Supreme Court precedent determining present issue). For an in-depth discussion
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks, see infra notes 56–62 and accompanying
text. For an in-depth discussion of Montana, see infra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
18. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 901–02 (concluding that Hicks is only applicable
when state law enforcement interests are present). The court emphasized that the
Supreme Court held that although land ownership is not dispositive of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, it is still a “significant factor” to consider. See id. at 902
(justifying interpretation of Hicks).
19. See id. at 905–06 (“It is true that Congress authorized state officials to
enter tribal land for the limited purpose of enforcing compulsory school attendance laws . . . . But, beyond officers enforcing truancy laws, such authorization and
consent do not abrogate the right to exclude state public schools . . . .”). The issue
before the court concerned the state’s interest in educating children on the reservation under its constitution. See id. at 905.
20. See id. at 906 (concluding that claim of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers was colorable under the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine); see also G. Sonny
Cave, Litigation with Indians, in MINERAL DEVELOPMENTS ON INDIAN LANDS, Ch. 6-1
(Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. eds., 1989) (explaining Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine). For
an in-depth discussion of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, see infra notes 66–68
and accompanying text.
21. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 382–85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)
(outlining constitutional issues with tribes asserting civil jurisdiction over nonmembers); see also Reeves, 861 F.3d at 916 (Christen, J., dissenting) (describing importance of protecting compelling state interests from tribal jurisdiction);
Babcock, supra note 4, at 509–10 (indicating that congressional polices and Supreme Court decisions have had a detrimental economic effect on tribes);
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 821 (commenting on lack of constitutional safeguards);
Krogstad, supra note 12 (illustrating level of poverty on tribal reservations); Miller,
supra note 13 (explaining that nonmembers choose not to invest and open up
businesses on tribal reservations out of fear of being subjected to tribal civil
jurisdiction).
22. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining lack of federal review or removal mechanism); cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987) (outlining reasonableness standard in federal personal jurisdiction doctrine); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985) (explaining need for “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
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limited tribal civil jurisdiction in the past and then discusses how the circuit courts have interpreted the Court’s precedent.23 Part III discusses the
facts and procedural history of Reeves and analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision-making in the case.24 Part IV considers the potential issues the Ninth
Circuit’s new framework creates and advocates for a potentially more
workable solution.25 Part V concludes by discussing Reeves’s impact on
future cases.26
II. THIS TOWN AIN’T BIG ENOUGH FOR THE TWO OF US: HOW COURTS
HAVE LIMITED TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS
During the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court endorsed broad
tribal power to assert jurisdiction over all individuals within its territory,
but beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the Court began to limit this
tribal power.27 The Court has held that tribes are prohibited from asserting criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.28 The Court has also consistently determined that tribes lack the power to assert civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers unless the tribe has retained this ability through either a
treaty or a congressional act.29 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged the
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring defendants to possess
minimum level of contacts with foreign jurisdiction such that the foreign court’s
assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction is fair); Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness:
Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1507–08 (2013) (arguing that adoption of federal personal jurisdiction doctrine to tribal jurisdiction
analyses regarding nonmember defendants is superior to current Supreme Court
framework).
23. For a further discussion of the development of tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers, see infra notes 27–96 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of the facts and procedural history of Reeves, see
infra notes 101–23 and accompanying text. For a narrative analysis of Reeves, see
infra notes 124–43 and accompanying text.
25. For a critical analysis of the Reeves decision, see infra notes 144–88 and
accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the impact of the Reeves decision, see infra notes
189–93 and accompanying text.
27. Compare Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831) (explaining
that tribes’ sovereignty is not completely overshadowed by the sovereignty of the
United States), with Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 547–48, 561 (1832) (discussing tribes’ sovereign ability to make and enforce their own laws). See generally
Babcock, supra note 4, at 469–70 (summarizing tribes’ inherent sovereignty).
28. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers). See generally Berger,
supra note 4, at 1049 (discussing how tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers); Deborah F. Buckman, Construction and Application of Federal Exhaustion
Doctrine, 186 A.L.R. FED. 71, § 2a (2003) (noting that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers). For a further discussion of the lack of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers, see infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
29. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 979 (outlining different ways that tribes can
retain their sovereignty); see also Florey, supra note 22, at 1524 (explaining methods
by which the United States can deprive tribes of their sovereignty). See generally
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general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember activity occurring on nonmember-fee land unless certain exceptions are
met.30 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been unclear as to whether
this presumption applies to nonmember activity arising on Indian-owned
land.31 Nevertheless, circuit courts have generally held that the presumption does extend to Indian-owned land.32
A. Reach for the Sky! The Supreme Court Robs Tribes of Their Sovereignty
Originally, tribes were understood to have complete jurisdiction over
anyone who entered the tribal reservation’s territory.33 In the late nineteenth century, Congress passed the General Allotment Act of 1887 and
other legislation that allowed land within Indian reservations to be sold off
and passed along to nonmembers for settlement in fee simple.34 This created a “checkerboard pattern” on reservations in which some land within
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (illustrating how tribes have
argued that they retained sovereignty over nonmembers).
30. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206 (discussing presumption against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers); see also Florey, supra note 22, at 1524 (acknowledging
federal presumption against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers). For an explanation of the exceptions to the presumption against tribal jurisdiction of nonmembers, see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
31. See Royster, supra note 8, at 902 (explaining that Supreme Court precedent is unclear as to what extent tribes may exert civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned land since its holding in Hicks). Royster
points out the different ways courts can interpret Hicks, such as a narrow reading
in which tribes easily gain civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on Indian-fee land.
See id. Hicks could also be read broadly such that Montana applies, and it becomes
more difficult for tribes to assert jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on
tribal land. See id.; see also Douglas B.L. Endreson, 55 VILL. L. REV. 863, 892–93
(2010) (explaining most Supreme Court cases have dealt with nonmember activity
arising on nonmember-fee land or its equivalent, but not nonmember activity occurring on tribal land). For a further discussion of Hicks, see infra notes 56–62 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of Montana, see infra notes 43–49 and
accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Stifel v. Lac Du Flambeau Band Lake Superior Chippewa Indians,
807 F.3d 184, 206–07 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that ownership status of land does
not automatically give tribes the ability to assert jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on the land); Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Herman, 786 F.3d 653, 660 n.5, 661
(8th Cir. 2015) (finding that tribes generally lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers even when conduct occurs on tribal land); MacArthur v. San Juan Cty., 497
F.3d 1057, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a presumption against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers exists when nonmember conduct occurs on Indianowned land).
33. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (acknowledging tribes’
right to self-government). Chief Justice Marshall found that this retained sovereignty was preserved in the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell between the United States
and Indian tribes. See id. at 551–52 (reasoning how tribe retained inherent sovereignty); see also Florey, supra note 22, at 1518–19 (discussing robust tribal sovereignty in nineteenth century).
34. See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (repealed 2000) (permitting sale of reservation
land); see also 25 U.S.C. § 348 (allowing United States government to sell surplus
tribal land).
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the territorial bounds of the reservation was owned by the tribe and other
land was owned by nonmembers in fee simple.35 In the twentieth century,
the Supreme Court followed suit and began slowly stripping tribes of their
ability to assert jurisdiction over nonmembers.36
In 1978, the Supreme Court held that tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.37
This case concerned two nonmembers who were residents of a reservation
and who were seeking habeas relief from criminal charges they faced in
tribal court.38 The Court concluded that tribes are domestic “dependent”
nations that ceded their autonomy to the sovereignty of the United
States.39 Based upon treaty provisions and acts of Congress, tribes presumptively do not have jurisdiction over nonmembers.40 Thus, nonmembers are generally not subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction.41 Although
35. See Florey, supra note 22, at 1519 (recognizing “checkerboard pattern” of
Indian-owned land and nonmember-fee land within Indian reservations created by
federal government (internal quotation marks omitted)). By creating areas within
reservations that are owned in fee simple by nonmembers, tribes dramatically increased the opportunity for legal friction between nonmembers and the tribe. See
id. (discussing increased property disputes arising between tribes and nonmembers on the reservation); see also Westeson, supra note 7 (discussing concerns of
Indian-owned land and nonmember-fee land existing within reservation).
36. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 507 (indicating Supreme Court trend of limiting inherent sovereignty of tribes); see also Berger, supra note 4, at 1053 (arguing
that Supreme Court has destroyed tribes’ inherent sovereignty to assert jurisdiction over nonmembers); Florey, supra note 22, at 1522–23 (asserting that the Supreme Court has dramatically reduced ability of tribes to assert jurisdiction over
nonmembers).
37. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
38. See id. at 194 (describing facts of case). Defendants were nonmembers
and residents of the Port Madison Reservation and arrested by tribal authorities.
See id. Defendants were charged in tribal court at which point they filed for habeas
relief in federal court arguing that the tribe lacked jurisdiction over them. See id.
39. See id. at 207–09 (“The Indian nations were, from their situation necessarily dependent on the United States for their protection from lawless and injurious
intrusions into their country.” (alterations and citation omitted)). According to
the Court, Indian tribes merely occupy land on reservations because the United
States has allowed them to do so. See id. (indicating United States exercises sovereignty over tribes); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823) (stating,
“their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished”).
40. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200–06 (illustrating federal government’s presumption against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers). The Court laid out congressional committee and Senate reports as evidence of the presumption against
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. See id. at 204–06 (referring to evidence supporting presumption against tribe’s power to assert jurisdiction over nonmembers). See generally Florey, supra note 22, at 1524 (discussing presumption against
tribes’ inherent sovereignty to assert jurisdiction over nonmembers).
41. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (holding that United States has exclusive jurisdiction over nonmember criminal conduct arising in the boundaries of reservations). See generally Berger, supra note 4, at 1056 (examining Supreme Court’s
decision in prohibiting tribal criminal jurisdiction). The Supreme Court was concerned with criminal defendants receiving a fair trial. See id. at 1057 (describing
reasoning for prohibition of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers).
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Oliphant’s holding is limited to criminal jurisdiction, it foreshadowed the
creation of a presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers.42
In a landmark case, the Court in Montana restricted tribes’ ability to
regulate nonmember conduct that occurred on nonmember-fee land that
sits within the boundaries of a reservation.43 Here, a tribe passed a resolution banning all hunting and fishing by nonmembers within the reservation, which conflicted with the state of Montana’s ongoing regulation of
hunting and fishing by nonmembers within the reservation.44 The tribe
argued that based on its inherent sovereignty, the tribe had civil regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers within the reservation.45 The Court disagreed and found that the tribe’s power to regulate did not extend to the
activities of nonmembers on nonmember-fee land.46 The Court stated
that, “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of tribes” absent congressional authority.47 The only exceptions to this general prohibition of tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction
over nonmembers are: (1) if the nonmember’s activity arises out of a private contract with the tribe; or (2) the nonmember’s activity threatens the
“political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
42. Compare Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (limiting tribal regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers), with Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (restricting tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over
nonmembers).
43. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 555 (holding tribes’ ability to regulate nonmember conduct within the reservation is severely limited when nonmember conduct
occurs on nonmember-fee land); see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 788–89 (explaining mix of nonmember-fee land and Indian-fee land within tribal reservations).
44. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 548–49 (describing conflict between Montana
and Crow Tribe over regulation of the Big Horn River). Montana stocked the fish
and game in and around the Big Horn River. See id. While the tribe claimed it had
inherent sovereignty to regulate nonmembers within the reservation, it also
claimed that the river was being held in trust by the United States for the tribe,
thus claiming the jurisdiction of the river. See id. (explaining argument of tribe for
inherent sovereignty to assert regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember).
45. Compare id. at 549 (detailing tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction over all those
who enter the boundaries of the reservation), with United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (declaring tribes have sovereignty over members and their
territory).
46. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (concluding that tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers is narrower than a tribes’ entire sovereignty). The Court relied on
its holding in Oliphant and extended its jurisdictional analysis to the civil context.
See id. But see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140 (1982) (maintaining that tribes can tax nonmember businesses on tribal land). For a further
analysis of Oliphant, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
47. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (citations omitted) (describing the extent of
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers). Nonmember hunting and fishing on
nontribal land has no bearing on tribal self-government or sovereignty. See id. (discussing lack of relationship between tribal self-government and nonmember activity at issue).
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tribe.”48 Montana’s general presumption against tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers and its two exceptions would serve as the framework for limiting tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in subsequent federal court
decisions.49
Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court extended Montana’s holding
to tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in Strate v. A-1 Contractors.50 Strate
involved a suit filed in tribal court where two nonmembers collided with
each other in a car accident on a state-operated highway that ran through
a reservation.51 The Court determined that the state highway was
equivalent to nonmember-fee land.52 Based on Montana, the Court reasoned that a tribe’s adjudicatory authority does not exceed its regulatory
authority.53 The Court then applied Montana and concluded that the car
accident did not arise out of a private contract with the tribe, nor did it
threaten the political integrity of the tribe.54 As a result, the Supreme
Court held that the tribe lacked the power to assert civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on non-Indian-fee land; how48. See id. at 565–66 (outlining exceptions to general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers). Private consensual relationships include
“commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” See id. at 565 (citation omitted). Threats to political integrity also include threats or direct effects on
“economic security and the “health or welfare of the tribe.” See id. at 566; see, e.g.,
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341
(2008) (explaining that nonmember activity must be “catastrophic” to tribe for
second Montana exception to be met); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley 532
U.S. 645, 654–55 (2001) (rejecting assertion that having benefit of tribal police
and emergency services creates private contract between nonmember and tribe
under Montana’s first exception).
49. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364–65 (2001) (applying Montana
framework to nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned land); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (utilizing Montana analysis in determining
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers).
50. 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (extending Montana to tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction analysis).
51. See id. at 442–43. The accident occurred on a road accessing a federal
water resource project. See id. at 442. North Dakota was charged with taking care
of the road and the road crossed land held in trust by the United States for three
tribes. See id. at 442–43. The tribe contracted with the defendant to perform work
on the reservation. See id. at 443.
52. See id. at 454 (determining state-controlled highway was not Indian land
and was equivalent to nonmember-fee land).
53. See id. at 453 (authorizing scope of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction
over nonmembers); see also Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66 (explaining Montana
framework based on essential factors to tribe sovereignty).
54. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (concluding that facts of case did not meet either of Montana’s exceptions). The contract between the defendant and the tribe
did not implicate the private consensual relationship exception because the accident was between the nonmember and the tribe and not between the nonmember
and anyone who was a tribal member. See id. (stating why first Montana exception
was not satisfied). See generally Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (discussing what constitutes a private contractual relationship under the first Montana exception, such as
“commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements”).
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ever, the Court did not decide whether Montana’s application extended to
conduct arising on Indian-owned land.55
In Hicks, the Court extended its Montana analysis to nonmember conduct that arose on Indian fee land, but left unclear whether its holding was
limited to the facts of the case.56 In Hicks, a state game warden executed a
search warrant on a tribal member’s land within a reservation.57 The tribal member asserted civil claims against the game warden in tribal court
for property damage caused during the search.58 The Court held that a
state’s jurisdiction does not end at the reservation border and that the
state had a powerful interest in executing its search warrants.59 The Court
applied its Montana framework and determined that the state’s interest did
not violate any of the exceptions.60 The Hicks Court concluded that land
ownership is only one factor to consider when applying Montana.61 However, the Court also included a footnote that makes it unclear whether
55. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (applying Montana to only adjudicatory jurisdiction on nonmember fee land).
56. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364–65 (2001) (extending Montana
framework to nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned land); see also
Fletcher, supra note 3, at 796–97 (explaining extension of Montana to Indianowned land in Hicks); Royster, supra note 8, at 902–03 (explaining that Hicks can
be read narrowly or broadly).
57. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 356. The tribal member was suspected of illegally
killing a sheep off of the reservation. See id. The state game warden obtained a
warrant to search the tribal member’s home located on tribal land. See id. (detailing why nonmember was on Indian-owned land). The state game warden obtained
the warrant from a state court on the condition that the warrant be approved by a
tribal court. See id. The tribal court approved the warrant and the game warden
searched the tribal member’s home without finding any evidence of wrongdoing.
See id. “Approximately one year later, a tribal police officer informed the state
game warden” that the officer had seen evidence supporting the suspicion that the
tribal member had killed the sheep. See id. The game warden obtained another
warrant and secured permission for the warrant from the tribal court. See id.
Upon searching the premises, no evidence of the sheep was found. See id.
58. See id. at 356–57 (noting that tribal member sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). Claims asserted included trespass, trespass to chattel, abuse of process,
and civil rights claims. See id.
59. See id. at 362 (holding that existence of compelling state interest trumps
sovereign interests of tribe). The Court based this assertion on previous precedent
in which state authority trumped a tribe’s authority. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Coleville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980) (holding that
state had an interest in collecting state taxes from nonmembers and state could
force tribe to collect tax on state’s behalf); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that states have exclusive jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising within tribal reservations). For a further discussion of
Oliphant, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
60. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364–65 (finding lack of jurisdiction when compelling
state interest exists and Montana exceptions are not met).
61. See id. at 360 (determining that ownership of land is only one factor in
analysis of whether it is necessary to regulate nonmembers to protect tribal
sovereignty).
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Hicks’s extension of the Montana framework to Indian-owned land is limited to its facts.62
Although the Supreme Court has limited tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in many areas, it has also preserved it in others.63 In Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe,64 the Court affirmed a tribe’s ability to exclude nonmembers and place conditions on nonmembers’ entry and continued
presence on tribal land.65 In National Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians,66 the Supreme Court held that when claims are initially filed in
tribal court, nonmembers must exhaust jurisdictional claims in the tribal
court system before seeking remedy in federal court to stop tribal jurisdiction, unless certain exceptions are met.67 These exceptions include: (1)
when tribal jurisdiction is asserted in bad faith; (2) when tribal jurisdiction
clearly violates expressed jurisdictional prohibitions; (3) when there is no
possible opportunity to challenge jurisdiction in tribal court; and (4)
when jurisdiction is plainly lacking.68
B. Rounding Up the Posse: The Circuit Courts Follow the
Supreme Court’s Lead
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks, circuit courts were left to
integrate the Supreme Court’s analyses from Hicks and Montana in cases
62. See id. at 358 n.2 (“Our holding in this case is limited to the question of
tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.”). See generally Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2017) (interpreting footnote in Hicks), amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14253 (9th Cir. Aug. 3,
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018); Fletcher, supra note 2, at 799 (asserting
that Hicks determined little about tribes’ power to assert civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned land).
63. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Tribe Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982)
(concluding that tribes possess power to exclude nonmembers and place conditions on their entry onto reservation); see also National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) (detailing Tribal Exhaustion
Doctrine).
64. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
65. See id. at 144 (affirming that tribes possess sovereign right to exclude and
place conditions on nonmember entry into tribal land). The Court articulated
that this power permits tribes to tax nonmember business activity on reservations
and tribes have the regulatory jurisdiction to remove nonmembers who do not
comply. See id. at 144–45; see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324, 333 (1983) (recognizing broad power of tribe to exclude nonmembers from
Indian land).
66. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
67. See id. at 855–56 (holding that nonmembers must exhaust all tribal remedies before seeking jurisdictional relief in federal court).
68. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) (“In National Farmers Union,
[the Court] recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad
faith, or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions,
or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.” (citations and alteration omitted)).
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arising from nonmember activity on tribal land.69 The Ninth Circuit initially interpreted Hicks slightly differently than its sister courts, but still
applied the Montana framework to nonmember activity occurring on Indian-owned land.70 Three other circuits have interpreted Hicks as standing for the general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned land and require courts to
apply the Montana analysis to determine if tribal civil jurisdiction exists.71
In MacArthur v. San Juan County,72 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit applied the Montana analysis to nonmember conduct on Indian-owned land based on Hicks.73 In this case, a Navajo Nation
tribal court asserted jurisdiction over county employees in the state of
Utah.74 The county employees worked at a Utah government health clinic
located on Indian-fee land on the Navajo reservation.75 The Tenth Circuit
interpreted Hicks as extending Montana to Indian-fee land.76 The Tenth
Circuit applied the Montana framework and found that the nonmember’s
69. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dis. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 917 (9th Cir.
2017) (Christen, J., dissenting) (summarizing how other circuits have interpreted
Hicks and how these courts have consistently held that Montana applies when nonmember conduct arises on tribal land), amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14253 (9th
Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018). The courts that have ruled on
this issue are the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See id. at 916–19.
For a further discussion of Hicks, see supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of Montana, see supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
70. Compare Water Wheel Camp Rec. Area, Inc. v. Larance, 642 F.3d 802, 810
(9th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the Montana framework is only implicated when a
compelling state interest is present when nonmember conduct occurs on Indian
land), with MacArthur v. San Juan Cty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1069 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the Montana framework is always implicated when tribal courts assert
jurisdiction over nonmembers in any situation).
71. See Stifel v. Lac DU Flambeau Band Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 807
F.3d 184, 209 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that Montana framework applies when nonmember conduct arises on tribal land); Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Herman, 786
F.3d 653, 659 (8th Cir. 2015) (declaring that Montana applies when attempting to
regulate nonmember conduct arising on tribal land); MacArthur, 497 F.3d at 1069
(rejecting argument that Montana does not apply on tribal land).
72. 497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).
73. See id. at 1060, 1069 (describing issue before the court and analyzing
whether Montana’s general rule applies). This case stemmed from a federal
court’s refusal to enforce injunctions issued by the Navajo Nation Tribal Court
against nonmember activity on tribal land. See id. at 1060 (explaining procedure
of case).
74. See id. at 1060, 1064 (explaining the district court’s conclusions).
75. See id. at 1061 (discussing the location of nonmember activity on tribal
land). San Juan County was operating a health clinic on tribal trust land. See id.
San Juan County relinquished ownership of the clinic, and the tribe assumed ownership and operation of it. See id.
76. See id. at 1069–70 (asserting that Montana framework is starting point in
any issue where a tribal court asserts jurisdiction over nonmembers). The Tenth
Circuit reiterated the presumption that tribal courts do not have sovereignty over
nonmembers. See id. at 1070. The only way to overcome this presumption is if the
conduct arises out of a private business relationship or threatens the political integrity of the tribe. See id.
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actions did not meet either of the two exceptions and thus, the tribe
lacked jurisdiction.77
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit came to a
similar conclusion in Stifel v. Lac DU Flambeau Band Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians.78 Here, a tribal corporation brought a suit against a bank in an
attempt to invalidate the sale of bonds to a nonmember bank.79 Relying
on Hicks, the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that Montana only
applies to actions arising on non-Indian-fee land.80 The Seventh Circuit
applied the Montana framework to the tribal entity’s sale of bonds on Indian-fee land and held that the tribe lacked jurisdiction.81
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also applied Montana to nonmember conduct on Indian-fee land in Belcourt Public
School District v. Herman.82 Similar to Reeves, this case involved a dispute
between a school operating on Indian-fee land and its employees.83 Ap77. See id. at 1077 (announcing lack of tribal civil jurisdiction over all plaintiffs). The MacArthur court also reversed the lower court’s finding that the tribal
court also asserted jurisdiction over one of its members who worked at the clinic.
See id. at 1076. The court based this decision on the “lack of a nexus between” the
plaintiff’s tribal membership and the cause of action. See id. The court held that
this cause of action arose out of the member’s employment with the state government. See id.
78. 807 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 2015); see also id. at 206 (applying Montana analysis
to nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned land).
79. See id. at 188–89. This controversy arose out of the sale of bonds by a
tribal corporation to Wells Fargo Bank, a nonmember. See id. at 189. In a previous
decision, the court found that the sale breached a bond indenture. See id. The
tribal court initiated an action in tribal court asserting that the bond sale between
the corporation and the nonmember bank was invalid under tribal law. See id. at
191–92. Nonmember parties filed actions in federal court seeking a declaration
that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction. See id.
80. See id. at 206 (rejecting assertion that Montana turns on the ownership
status of land). The court explained that Hicks requires courts to apply the Montana framework. See id. at 206–07. Land ownership is only one fact to consider
and is not dispositive of tribal jurisdiction. See id.
81. See id. at 209 (concluding that Montana exceptions are not satisfied).
There was no private consensual relationship because there was no nexus between
the tribal regulation of nonmember conduct and the financial arrangement. See
id. at 207–08. The court determined that the tribal court was only seeking to invalidate the bond sales. See id. However, the sale took place off the reservation and
the only activity that took place on tribal land was the misrepresentation of the sale
by nonmembers. See id. at 207. The tribal court was seeking to invalidate the sale
that took place off the reservation rather than determine appropriate redress for
the misrepresentation that took place on tribal land, and therefore, the first Montana exception was not met. See id. at 207–08. The second Montana exception was
not satisfied because the bond sale only affected the tribe’s enforceability of a commercial agreement, not its political integrity. See id. at 209.
82. 786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015); see also id. at 660 n.5, 661 (explaining that
ownership status of land is not dispositive of tribal jurisdiction).
83. See Herman, 786 F.3d at 661 (explaining allegations of employment-related
claims arose from school standing on Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians
reservation); see also Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, No. CV-12-08059,
2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2013) (explaining that
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plying Hicks, the Eighth Circuit extended the Montana analysis to Indianfee land.84 The Eighth Circuit applied the Montana framework and determined that the action did not arise from a private contractual relationship
between the school district and the tribe, even though the school district
had an operational agreement with the tribe.85 The court reasoned that
the first Montana exception was not implicated because the school district
was fulfilling its powerful state interest in carrying out its constitutional
duty to provide education to all children in the state.86 The court also
determined that Montana’s second exception was not satisfied because the
school district’s actions did not threaten the political integrity of the
tribe.87 Therefore, the tribe lacked jurisdiction.88
In a slightly different interpretation of Hicks, the Ninth Circuit held
that courts should only apply Montana when there are competing state
interests at stake.89 In Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v.
teachers sued school on Navajo reservation for violation of employment rights),
rev’d, 861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2017).
84. See Herman, 786 F.3d at 660 n.5, 661 (pointing out that Indian ownership
of land is not dispositive of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers). The court
relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Hicks and held that Montana’s framework applied regardless of where the nonmember conduct occurred. See id.
85. See id. at 659 (holding that contracts between tribes and state governments
are not considered private consensual relationships under Montana). When
school districts are acting in their official capacities under their state constitutions,
contracts between states and tribes do not constitute a private consensual relationship. See id. (asserting that powerful state interests—like education—preempt tribal jurisdiction).
86. See id. at 659 (identifying no consensual relationship between tribe and
state). Employment related claims between a state and its employees on tribal land
do not qualify as private consensual relationships under Montana. See id.
87. See id. at 660–61 (holding that Montana’s second exception is only satisfied when consequences of nonmember conduct are “catastrophic” to tribal political sovereignty). The court explained that tribes cannot assert civil jurisdiction
over nonmember conduct that is not necessary for the tribe’s right of self-government and regulation of internal relations, unless Congress has expressly permitted
tribes to do. See id. (“The Court in Hicks emphasized the necessarily narrow scope
of the second Montana exception when it confirmed that, where nonmembers are
concerned, the exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”
(citations, internal quotation, and alteration omitted) (emphasis added)). The
claims against the school did not rise to this extremely high threshold. See id.
88. See id. at 662 (concluding that tribe lacked jurisdiction over nonmembers).
89. See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. Larance, 642 F.3d 802,
810–14 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the Montana framework is only applicable
when compelling state interests are present on tribal land); see also Grand Canyon
Skywalk Developer, LLC v. “SA” Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (9th Cir.
2013) (stating that Montana framework is only applicable if there are compelling
state interests present when nonmember conduct arises on tribal land). This controversy arose when a tribe asserted eminent domain over a nonmember business’s
skywalk in the Grand Canyon. See id. at 1198–99. The Ninth Circuit ruled that
although Montana was not implicated, the facts satisfied the exception as outlined
under Montana. See id. at 1205–06. The nonmember business had engaged in a
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Larance,90 a resort leased land held in trust by the United States for the
Colorado Indian River Tribes.91 The resort stopped making lease payments to the tribes but continued to operate on the Indian-owned land.92
The tribe sued the resort operator, and the Ninth Circuit held that because no competing state interests existed, Montana did not apply.93
Thus, the tribal court had both regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction
over the nonmember because the conduct occurred on tribal land.94 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit still applied Montana, the way other circuits
have, in an alternative holding and declared that its conclusion would still
be the same because both Montana exceptions would apply.95 The Ninth
Circuit would ultimately supplant this scheme with a new jurisdictional
framework based on the status of land ownership in Reeves.96
private consensual relationship with the tribe by contracting to share revenues
from operating the skywalk. See id. at 1204 (discussing satisfaction of Montana’s
first exception). The second exception of Montana would have also been met because the tribe had a tremendous interest in leasing its own land to the nonmember business. See id.
90. 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011).
91. See id. at 805. A nonmember resort had a contract to lease land held in
trust by the United States for Colorado River Indian tribes for thirty-two years. See
id.
92. See id. at 805. After the lease expired, the nonmember resort refused to
vacate the land and refused to make any more payments. See id. The nonmember
resort continued to operate rent free for an additional seven years. See id.
93. See id. at 805. The tribes brought civil claims against the resort in tribal
court to evict the nonmember resort operator, to collect unpaid rent that had
accumulated over the years, and to obtain damages for the loss of the tribal property during the time rent was unpaid. See id.; see also id. at 813–14 (“We have recognized the limited applicability of Hicks” and “reject[] the argument that Montana
should be extended to bar tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians on
tribal land because doing so would be even inconsistent with Montana’s narrow
holding . . . .” (citing McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530, 540 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002))).
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Montana framework is implicated, as outlined
in Hicks, only when specific state interests are also present when nonmember conduct occurs on tribal land. See id. at 814. The Ninth Circuit stated that tribal
courts could assert civil jurisdiction over the nonmember based on the tribe’s
power to exclude. See id. at 813–14.
94. See id. at 816 (noting absence of compelling state interest).
95. See id. at 816–19 (stating Montana’s exceptions would be satisfied if Montana applied). The first exception would be met based on the private consensual
relationship of the lease between the nonmember resort operator and the tribes.
See id. at 817. The second Montana exception would be satisfied because the unlawful occupancy of the tribal trust land prevented the tribe from governing the
land, thus threatening the tribe’s political integrity. See id. at 819.
96. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir.
2017) (concluding Navajo Nation did have jurisdiction based on Supreme Court
precedent, Treaty of 1868, and Arizona Constitution), amended by 2017 U.S. App.
Lexis 14253 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018). See generally
ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (mandating creation and support of public school system); New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 61-219, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat.
557, 569–70 (1910) (granting Arizona statehood on condition that Arizona adopt
a constitutional provision creating and supporting a public school system and
forfeiting any right to tribal land within the state); Treaty with the Navaho, Navajo-
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In June 2017, the Ninth Circuit once again faced the issue of whether
tribal courts could assert jurisdiction over nonmember conduct occurring
on tribal land in Reeves.97 This case arose out of a dispute between two
public school districts operating on leased tribal land and their employees.98 The court concluded that Montana did not apply regardless of the
state’s interest in providing education to reservation children as required
by Arizona’s constitution, and further, that tribal ownership of land is essentially dispositive of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.99 Based on
this newly proposed framework, the court ultimately held that it was at
least plausible that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the school.100
A. Facts and Procedure of Reeves
Window Rock Unified School District and Pinon Unified School District were Arizona public schools operating on tribal land and providing
education to children of the Navajo Nation.101 Pursuant to Arizona’s constitution and related statutes, the state was required to provide education
to all children, including those residing on tribal reservations.102 Both
schools operated on Navajo land.103 Window Rock’s lease with the Navajo
Nation provided that the school district abide by Navajo law unless it conflicted with Arizona or federal law.104 Pinon’s lease contained no such
language.105 Two of the complainants had clauses in their contracts that
stated any employment disputes will be resolved in state or federal
U.S., June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667 (containing articles and agreements of treaty between the Navajo Nation and the United States).
97. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 896 (stating issue presented to Ninth Circuit).
98. See id. at 901 (announcing Montana framework only applicable to nonmember conduct on tribal land if state law enforcement interests are at stake).
99. See id. at 905–06 (disregarding state’s assertion of fulfilling its constitutional duty). Based on treaties and contracts between the school and the tribe, the
Navajo tribes retained the right to exclude school officials from their land. See id.
at 904–05 (explaining that the right to exclude is derived from the tribe’s
sovereignty).
100. See id. at 906 (concluding that state must exhaust tribal remedies because
tribal civil jurisdiction is plausible).
101. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, No. CV-12-08059, 2013
U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2013), rev’d, 861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2017).
102. See id. at *1–2; see also ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (mandating creation and
support of public school system).
103. See Reeves, 861 F.3d. at 896.
104. See id. (outlining provisions in the lease). The lease also stated that by
abiding by Navajo law, the schools “d[id] not forfeit any rights under state or federal laws.” See id.
105. See id.
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court.106 School employees initially filed civil complaints against the
school districts in state court but refiled in Navajo tribal court after receiving adverse judgments in state court.107 All seven complainants filed civil
claims against the school districts with the Navajo Nation Labor Commission in which some alleged they were owed merit pay and others accused
the school district of violating their rights under Navajo law.108
In tribal court, the school districts filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, but rather than grant the motion, the Navajo tribal court ordered an evidentiary hearing.109 In response, the school districts filed actions in Arizona district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on
the grounds that the tribal court lacked civil regulatory and adjudicatory
jurisdiction over the nonmember school districts.110 The Navajo Nation
and the employees argued that the school districts’ actions should be dismissed for being premature under the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine.111
In the district court, the tribe and the employees based their argument on the tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers as outlined in the
Treaty of 1868, along with the tribe’s inherent sovereignty.112 The treaty
contained a provision that allowed the Navajo Nation to exclude all nonmembers from tribal land except for specific federal agents.113 In the al106. See id. at 908 (Christen, J., dissenting) (noting clauses in employment
contract). The dissent takes umbrage with the majority’s opinion for leaving out
key facts about the procedural history of the case; thus, the dissenting opinion
provides a more detailed explanation of the facts in this case. See id. (arguing
majority failed to consider key facts regarding procedural history of case in majority’s analysis).
107. See id. at 907 (describing prior history of case). Claimants also received
adverse judgments in Arizona intermediate court, but decided against appealing to
the Arizona Supreme Court. See id. at 907–08 (discussing procedural history of
case).
108. See id. (discussing claims brought against school district).
109. See id. at 908 (discussing type of evidence requested by tribal court).
110. See id. at 908–09 (discussing claims asserted by state in federal court); see
also Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, No. CV-12-08059, 2013 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 37751, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2013) (stating action taken by tribal court),
rev’d, 861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2017). The tribal court claimed it needed this evidentiary hearing to determine if it had jurisdiction. See id.
111. See Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *6. The tribe and employees
asserted that the school districts failed to satisfy any of the four exceptions to the
Tribal Exhaustion doctrine. See id. at *6–7. The school districts relied on the
fourth exception to the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine that warrants federal court
intervention when tribal jurisdiction is clearly lacking. See id. at *7; see also supra
note 68 and accompanying text for list of exceptions to Tribal Exhaustion
Doctrine.
112. See Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *8–9. See generally Treaty with
the Navaho, Navajo-U.S., June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
113. See Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *9 (explaining treaty argument
as basis for tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on tribal
land). The United States agreed that unauthorized individuals would not be permitted to access the tribal reservation without the consent of the Navajo tribe. See
id. The treaty only prohibited the tribe from exercising its exclusion power for
specific federal agents entering reservation land. See id. This permitted the tribe
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ternative, the tribe also argued that it had inherent sovereignty to exclude
nonmembers from tribal land and to place conditions on nonmember entrance onto tribal land.114 The tribe and employees relied on precedent
from the Ninth Circuit to argue that inherent tribal sovereignty allows the
tribe to exercise civil jurisdiction over the school districts and its employment related decisions.115
The district court ultimately applied Montana and held that the tribe
lacked jurisdiction because neither of the Montana exceptions were satisfied.116 Based on Ninth Circuit precedent, including Water Wheel, the
court stated that tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct occurring on tribal land when compelling state interests are present,
unless one of the two Montana exceptions are met.117 The court found
that Arizona had a compelling interest in fulfilling its constitutional duty
to provide education, which implicated Montana.118 The court also determined that the Treaty of 1868 is preempted by Arizona’s constitution.119
to place conditions on nonmember visitors, such as the school, thus allowing the
tribe to exercise civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction. See id. See generally
Treaty with the Navaho art. 2, Navajo-U.S., June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
114. See Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *11–12 (explaining tribe’s argument for civil jurisdiction over nonmembers based on inherent authority).
115. See id. at *12–13 (summarizing tribe’s argument for federal common law
right for inherent sovereignty to exclude nonmembers from tribal land); see also
Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. Larance, 642 F.3d 802, 814 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that nonmember conduct occurring on tribal land and interfering
with tribes’ exclusion power in the absence of competing state interest is subject to
tribal regulatory jurisdiction). The status of land ownership is dispositive when
there are no competing state interests at stake. See id.; see also Grand Canyon
Skywalk, LLC v. “SA” Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that Montana framework was restricted to non-Indian land held in fee simple
when no state interests present).
116. Compare Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 897
(9th Cir. 2017) (recounting district court’s conclusion that Navajo court lacked
civil jurisdiction over school districts), amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14253 (9th
Cir. Aug 3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018), with Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 37751, at *18–30 (analyzing facts under Montana framework and concluding
that both exceptions are satisfied).
117. See Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *13–14. The court determined
that Arizona’s constitutional duty to provide education to the children of the state
constituted a compelling state interest. See id. at *17–18; see also Water Wheel, 642
F.3d at 814 (declaring that Montana exceptions must be met for tribal civil jurisdiction assertion over nonmember conduct arising on tribal land when compelling
state interests are at play).
118. See Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *18–20 (explaining that that
education qualifies as a compelling state interest under Montana analysis).
119. See id. at *11 (reasoning that the Navajo’s power to exclude cannot infringe on Arizona’s constitutional duty to provide public education). The court
determined that the federal government’s duty to provide public education on
Navajo tribal land and its immunity from tribal civil jurisdiction was effectively
passed to the state of Arizona. See id. (interpreting Treaty of 1868); see also New
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 61-219, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 569
(1910) (mandating that Arizona provide public school for children in the state).
The enabling act also declared that providing public education is exclusively a
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It declared that the first Montana exception was not met because the leases
between the state and the tribe cannot infringe on employment related
decisions made by the state while carrying out its constitutional duty.120
The court also held that the second Montana exception was not met because the school district’s conduct was not fatal to the tribe’s political integrity.121 Because neither of Montana’s exceptions were met, the court
determined that the Navajo Nation lacked jurisdiction.122 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed this decision and held that tribes have
broad power to assert civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising
on Indian-owned land when state law enforcement interest are not at
stake.123
B. There’s a New Sherriff in Town: The Ninth Circuit Creates a New Tribal
Jurisdiction Framework
The Reeves majority began its analysis by discussing the broad scope of
a tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers and exercise civil jurisdiction over
them on tribal land.124 The court explained that tribes have never ceded
state duty. See New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act § 26. Compare Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1959) (acknowledging broad tribal sovereignty in exercising
jurisdiction over all tribal affairs), with United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326
(1978) (indicating limitations to exclusive tribal sovereignty over Indian affairs resulting from congressional activity and tribes’ dependency on the United States).
120. See Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *22–24 (summarizing how tribe
failed to satisfy first Montana exception). The Navajo statutory provisions that the
tribal court would have used to determine the employment related claims by the
school would adversely affect the school district and the state such that radically
different outcomes could be reached depending on whether tribal or state law was
applied. See id. at *23–24.
121. See id. at *28–29. The court determined that the Navajo Nation failed to
show how depriving them of civil jurisdiction over this employment dispute threatens the existence of its tribal government. See id. at *28; see also Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 544 U.S. 316, 341 (2008) (describing standard for second Montana exception).
122. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir.
2017) (“In sum, because the conduct at issue here occurred on tribal land over
which the Navajo Nation has the right to exclude nonmembers, and because state
criminal law enforcement interests are not present, we hold that tribal jurisdiction
is at least colorable and exhaustion in the tribal forum is therefore required.”),
amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14253 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 648 (2018).
123. See id. Contra Reeves, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37751, at *30–31 (holding that
Navajo tribal court could not exercise tribal jurisdiction over nonmember public
school operating on tribal land).
124. See Reeves, 861 F.3d. at 899 (“The Supreme Court has long recognized
that Indian tribes have sovereign powers, including the power to exclude nontribal members from tribal land.” (citation omitted)); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 142 (1982) (discussing ability of tribes to place conditions on nonmember entry onto tribal land based in power to exclude). Because
tribes can place conditions on nonmember entry they can essentially regulate nonmember behavior. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333
(1983) (recognizing broad scope of power of tribe to exclude nonmembers from
Indian land).
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their inherent sovereignty to regulate and adjudicate nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned land.125 This sovereignty can only be limited through congressional mandate or treaty.126 Because precedent like
Montana and Strate only concerned non-Indian land, the Reeves majority
proposed a general presumption that tribes retain civil jurisdiction over
nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned land.127
Relying on a footnote in Hicks, the Reeves majority then explained that
Hicks only applies when state law enforcement interests are present.128 Although the Supreme Court stated that ownership of land is not dispositive
to impart tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers in Hicks, the Reeves
court concluded that it is still a significant factor to consider.129 The
Ninth Circuit—reading a footnote in Hicks to limit its holding to the
facts—concluded that the Montana analysis is only required when permitting tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on Indian land threatens
state law enforcement interests.130 The Reeves majority concluded that
Montana does not apply because the only potential state interest present in
Reeves is Arizona’s constitutional duty to educate children.131
The Reeves majority next examined whether the Navajo Nation relinquished its power to exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal
land through either treaty or congressional statute.132 The court deter125. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 899–900 (explaining how tribes retained inherent
sovereignty to exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers occupying tribal land).
126. See id. (describing process that tribes forfeit their sovereign rights); see
also Iowa Mutual Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (detailing ability of federal
government to limit tribal sovereignty).
127. Compare Reeves, 861 F.3d at 900–01 (announcing presumption of tribal
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers conduct occurring on tribal land), with Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–67 (1981) (holding that tribe lacked inherent sovereignty to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers occupying
land in fee simple within boundary of the reservation). See generally Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (concluding that tribe lacked adjudicatory
jurisdiction over nonmember conduct occurring on non-Indian land within the
boundaries of reservation).
128. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 903–04 (interpreting Hicks to be limited to specific
compelling state law enforcement interest).
129. Compare id. at 902 (“[The Supreme] Court reaffirmed, however, that the
ownership status of land is a significant factor that may sometimes be dispositive.”
(quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis added)), with Nevada v. Hicks, 533
U.S. 353, 370 (“The ownership status of land is . . . only one factor to consider
when determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.” (quotation and
citation omitted)).
130. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 903 (interpreting footnote number two in the
Hicks majority opinion as limiting the decision to its facts); see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at
358 n.2 (“Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.”).
131. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 905 (analyzing Arizona’s interest in fulfilling constitutional duty to provide public education to children).
132. See id. at 904–05 (examining whether tribe retained exclusion right in
Treaty of 1868). Compare Treaty with the Navahoe art. 2, Navajo-U.S., June 1, 1868,
15 Stat. 667 (containing articles and agreements of treaty between the Navajo Na-
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mined that the Navajo Nation only ceded its power to exclude federal officials and that the Navajo still retained the power to exclude state officials
under the Treaty of 1868.133 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that this
federal duty to educate was not passed to Arizona through congressional
statute because the statute is silent as to whether school officials can enter
tribal land.134 Therefore, the Navajos retained their power to both exclude state officials from their land and to exercise civil jurisdiction over
them.135 The Reeves majority concluded that the Navajos could assert jurisdiction over the schools under the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine because
the tribes maintain broad power to assert jurisdiction over nonmember
conduct arising on Indian-owned land when there are no state law enforcement interests implicated.136
C. The Quickest Draw Always Wins: The Reeves Dissent Duels with the
Majority at High Noon
Reeves’s dissenters argue that the majority’s holding is incorrect because it misinterprets Hicks and ignores Arizona’s powerful constitutional
tion and the United States), with New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. No.
61-219, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 570 (1910) (granting Arizona statehood on
condition that Arizona adopted constitutional provision to create and support
public school system).
133. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 904. The treaty compels the Navajo tribe to send
their children to school and compels the federal government to send teachers to
enter and reside upon tribal land in order to fulfill the treaty provision and educate tribal children. See id. However, the treaty is silent as to the state’s duty to
send Arizona state teachers to enter and reside upon Indian land and therefore,
the majority concludes that the tribe did not forfeit its power to exclude state public schools from tribal land or place conditions upon its entrance onto tribal land.
See id.; see also Treaty with the Navahoe art. 6, Navajo-U.S., Jun. 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667
(outlining compulsory education agreement between Navajo Nation and federal
government).
134. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 905. Because there is no specific language in the
enabling act and the state forfeited any claims to tribal land as part of the act, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal educational duty in the Treaty of 1868
did not pass along to the state upon Arizona’s grant of statehood. See id. That the
state of Arizona had to sign leases to operate on the land was further evidence that
the Navajos never ceded the sovereign authority to exclude state officials. See id. at
905–06. Compare Reeves, 861 F.3d at 905 (explaining that the Arizona constitution
did not fully supplant the federal government’s education duty in the Treaty of
1868), with New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 61-219, ch. 310, § 20, 36
Stat. 557, 569–70 (1910) (granting Arizona statehood on condition that Arizona
adopt constitutional provision creating and supporting public school system and
forfeiting any right to tribal territory within the state).
135. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 906 (announcing that tribal jurisdiction over employment claims is not plainly lacking under exhaustion doctrine).
136. See id. at 905–06 (“In sum, because the conduct at issue here occurred on
tribal land over which the Navajo Nation has the right to exclude nonmembers,
and because state criminal law enforcement interests are not present, we hold that
tribal jurisdiction is at least colorable or plausible and that exhaustion in the tribal
forum is therefore required.”).
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mandate.137 The dissent claimed the majority ignored the presumption
stated in Montana that tribes generally do not have the power to assert civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers.138 Instead, the Reeves majority relies on
the presumption that tribes do generally retain civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on tribal land, which contravenes Montana’s presumption.139 The dissent further asserts that the footnote in Hicks merely limits
Hicks’s holding to state actors, which should trigger Montana because Arizona public school officials are state actors.140 The Reeves dissent also argues that Ninth Circuit precedent does not support the majority’s new
interpretation of Hicks.141 Based on the precedent set forth in Water
Wheel, the court should have analyzed Reeves under Montana because Arizona had a compelling state interest to fulfill its constitutional duty to provide education.142 The dissent concludes that neither of the Montana

137. See id. at 907 (Christen, J., dissenting) (outlining disagreements with majority’s analyses and conclusion).
138. See id. (arguing that majority ignored presumption outlined in Montana);
see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (stating general presumption against tribes’ ability to assert civil jurisdiction over nonmembers).
139. Compare Reeves, 861 F.3d at 907 (arguing that the majority failed to acknowledge presumption that tribal civil jurisdiction typically does not extend to
nonmembers), with Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2001) (stating presumption against tribal sovereignty extending to nonmembers, at least when state
law enforcement interests are present). See generally Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008) (reaffirming presumption that tribal sovereignty does not generally extend to nonmembers). For a further discussion of Hicks, see supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
140. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 918–19 (“Essentially, the panel majority decides
that the Supreme Court did not mean what it said [in Hicks]. It relies on an entirely strained reading of the second footnote in Hicks.”). The dissent argues that
the footnote focuses on the classification status of the nonmember in order to
prevent the creation of a bright line rule applying to every type of nonmember. See
id.; see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2 (“Our holding in this case is limited to the
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.”).
141. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 916 (explaining that precedent does not support
majority’s interpretation of Hicks). The dissent asserts that Ninth Circuit precedent requires Montana’s application when compelling state interests are at stake.
See id.; see also Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc. v. Larance, 642 F.3d 802,
810–14 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring application of Montana when compelling state
interests are present, when tribes attempt to assert civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on tribal land); Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC v.
“SA” Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2013) (determining that Montana must be applied when tribal civil jurisdiction is asserted over nonmember
conduct arising on tribal land and compelling state interests exist).
142. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 916 (concluding that precedent required Montana
analysis due to Arizona’s compelling interest in fulfilling its constitutional duty);
see also ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (mandating creation and support of public school
system); New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 61-219, ch. 310, § 20, 36
Stat. 557, 570 (1910) (granting Arizona statehood on condition that Arizona adopt
constitutional provision creating and supporting public school system).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss1/5

22

Murphy: The State, the Tribe, and the Ugly: The Ninth Circuit Stakes a Ba

2018]

NOTE

179

exceptions would have been met and that jurisdiction was plainly lacking
under the fourth exception of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine.143
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE REEVES FRAMEWORK IS WANTED DEAD
ALIVE FOR WOUNDING THE INTERESTS OF STATES, TRIBES, AND
NONMEMBERS

OR

The tribal civil jurisdiction framework for nonmember conduct on
Indian-owned land proposed by the Reeves majority may be imprudent because it comes at the detriment of nonmember rights, the compelling and
diverse interests of the states, and tribes’ political and economic integrity.144 Congress and the Supreme Court have sought to limit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers out of a fear that tribes will be prejudicial to
nonmembers and fail to provide a fair trial.145 The Reeves majority never
mentions these concerns and their analytical framework only exacerbates
them.146 Limiting compelling state interests to exclusively law enforce143. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 919–22 (arguing that neither Montana exception
was satisfied and that Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine exception was met). The dissent
concluded that the first exception was not met because the employees’ contracts
clearly state that all grievances must be adjudicated by state and federal law. See id.
at 920. The dissent also stated that the second exception would likely not have
been met because failure to assert civil jurisdiction over school related employment relationships would not be absolutely detrimental to tribal political integrity.
See id. at 920–21. Because the Montana exceptions were not met, and several of the
employees lost their claims on the merits in state court, the dissent argued that
jurisdiction was clearly lacking. See id.; see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 369 (stating tribal
exhaustion was not required when tribal jurisdiction is obviously lacking).
144. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 917 (arguing that state constitutional duties to
provide public educations should be considered a legitimate non-law enforcement
state interest). Compare id. at 906 (majority opinion) (holding ownership status of
land dispositive of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on tribal land when no state law enforcement interests are present), with Hicks, 533 U.S.
at 382–85 (Souter, J., concurring) (expressing concerns of broad tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers), and Miller, supra note 13 (explaining link between
severe poverty on reservations and nonmember fear of submitting to tribal jurisdiction for investing on tribal land).
145. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 821–22 (explaining lack of constitutional
protections afforded to nonmembers in trial court). Tribes are not bound nor
required to enforce the fundamental protections afforded to Americans. See id.
Tribal courts are not accountable to nonmembers because nonmembers cannot
take part in the political processes of the tribe. See id. at 823. Tribal courts are not
independent of the tribal legislature, and these tribal legislatures can remove
judges and reverse tribal judge decisions they do not agree with, meaning tribal
court decisions can be heavily influenced by tribal politics. See id. at 823–24.
There is also a fear that tribal customs do not recognize private property rights and
that application of tribal conceptions of property law would be detrimental to nonmembers. See id. at 826 (outlining differences between tribal customs and American customs). There is also a concern that tribes are resentful of nonmembers and
would racially discriminate against nonmembers in tribal court. See id. at 826.
146. Compare Reeves, 861 F.3d at 906 (holding ownership status of land dispositive of tribal civil jurisdiction in absence of state law enforcement interests), with
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 382–85 (explaining dangers of finding nonmember conduct arising on tribal land dispositive of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers).
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ment interests fails to account for other diverse state interests and leaves
the task of defining their relative importance in the hands of tribes who
potentially have conflicting interests.147 Tribal reservations in the United
States are impoverished and its members are consistently taken advantage
of by nonmembers.148 The Ninth Circuit’s framework leaves tribes vulnerable to sophisticated nonmembers who—after committing careless and
harmful acts within tribal reservations—may intentionally avoid tribal jurisdiction under the new framework.149 A superior solution would be for
Congress to permit federal review of nonmember cases in tribal courts and
extend to tribal courts the personal jurisdiction framework currently in
use for state and federal courts.150
A. The Jurisdictional Noose Tightens Around Nonmembers, States,
and the Tribe
Congress and the Supreme Court have been reluctant to permit expansive tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers due to a fear that tribes
are biased against outsiders and that tribal courts may fail to protect the
fundamental rights of nonmembers.151 First, unlike states, tribes are not
bound by the principles and protections afforded by the United States
Constitution or Supreme Court precedent.152 This is the basis for the fear
147. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 916–17 (Christen, J., dissenting) (describing tribal
court’s inability to meaningfully adjudicate compelling state interests concerning
state’s constitutional duty to provide public schools); see also Fletcher, supra note 2,
at 821–26 (outlining potential ways tribal courts are prejudicial to nonmembers
and their rights).
148. See Miller, supra note 13 (“The lack of economic development on reservations is a major factor in creating extreme poverty, unemployment, and the accompanying social issues Indian nations face.”).
149. See Koppisch, supra note 13 (explaining that nonmembers avoid opening
businesses within tribal reservation due to fear of being subject to tribal court jurisdiction); cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893–94 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that sophisticated manufacturer successfully and
intentionally avoided state jurisdiction where its product injured plaintiff even with
a robust balancing test in place). See generally Florey, supra note 22, at 1507–08,
1556 (promoting implementation of federal personal jurisdiction doctrine to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers).
150. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (explaining the lack of federal review procedure to hold tribal courts accountable, as well as the lack of a removal procedure
to remove cases against nonmembers in tribal to federal court); see also Florey,
supra note 22, at 1507–08, 1556 (advocating adoption of federal personal jurisdiction doctrine to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers and explaining “much of
personal jurisdiction doctrine is particularly well suited to the tribal context”).
151. Compare Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978)
(declaring that tribes lack any criminal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct occurring within boundaries of reservation), with Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (summarizing
potential issues with finding status of land ownership as dispositive of tribal civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers). But see Reeves, 861 F.3d at 906 (majority opinion)
(finding ownership status of land dispositive for tribal civil jurisdiction in absence
of state law enforcement interests).
152. See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383–84 (noting tribes are not bound by United
States Constitution). Tribes are not considered states as defined under the United
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that tribes are likely to infringe on the personal liberty of nonmembers,
which is otherwise protected by the Constitution.153 There is also a concern that tribal courts are too foreign for nonmembers to understand and
adequately defend themselves in.154 This is because the customs and practices of tribal courts are often based on tribal traditions that are passed
down orally and not typically codified.155 There is also no mechanism for
federal review of tribal courts’ decisions, and thus, federal courts cannot
inspect how tribal courts are deciding cases involving nonmembers.156
The Reeves majority’s new tribal jurisdiction framework only serves to
inflame these concerns in the Ninth Circuit by basing tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on tribal land on the ownership
status of the land.157 The boundaries of Indian-owned land have never
been clear within Indian reservations, and most reservations consist of a
checkerboard pattern of Indian-owned land and nonmember-fee land.158
States Constitution and thus are not beholden to the Fourteenth Amendment or
the Bill of Rights, which guarantee American citizens protections from government infringements. See id. Although Congress tried to make tribes comply with
these protections with the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, many tribes do not follow Supreme Court precedent regarding the constitutional protections. See id. at
384 (explaining short comings of Indian Civil Rights Act). See generally 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a) (2012) (identifying rights equivalent to the Bill of Rights that Indians
should be afforded); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194 (discussing issues with tribal enactment of Indian Civil Rights Act). For in-depth discussion of Oliphant, see supra
notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
153. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (commenting on concern of infringement on
nonmember personal liberties); see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 822 (explaining
that tribal courts are not bound by the United States Constitution to guarantee
nonmembers federal due process rights).
154. See id. (comparing differences between tribal court and American court
traditions and procedures). Some tribal court procedures are similar to their
American counterparts, such as relying on rules based on the values, norms, and
customs of the tribe that nonmembers would be unfamiliar with. See id.; see also
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 823–26 (explaining potential deficiencies and cultural
differences between tribal and American courts that would be a cause for concern
by nonmembers).
155. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (indicating that many tribal laws are unwritten
and passed down orally from one generation to the next); see also Fletcher, supra
note 2, at 798 (noting that many tribes’ law is unwritten and difficult for outsiders
to ascertain).
156. See id. at 385 (explaining lack of federal review or removal mechanism).
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (permitting removal only for civil actions
brought in state courts that districts courts have original jurisdiction over); 28
U.S.C. 1257(a) (authorizing Supreme Court review of state court decisions where
federal law is implicated).
157. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir.
2017) (holding that landownership status is dispositive of tribal civil jurisdiction
over nonmember conduct arising on tribal land, absent a state law enforcement
concern), amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14253 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018).
158. See Florey, supra note 22, at 1519 (discussing sale of tribal land to nonmembers with no distinguishable boundaries).
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Nonmembers would have little notice when they are at risk of being hailed
into tribal court while traveling through reservations.159
Imagine that a nonmember family is involved in a car accident while
driving on roads through a reservation, but unbeknownst to them, some
roads are owned by the tribe and others are owned by the state.160 According to other circuit courts, if the accident occurred on a tribal road,
the tribe could only assert civil jurisdiction if one of the two Montana exceptions were met.161 However, under the Ninth Circuit’s Reeves framework, the tribal court would be able to assert civil jurisdiction because
there were no state law enforcement interests present.162 The family may
then be exposed to foreign laws and customs, possibly without regard for
their personal liberties.163
The Ninth Circuit’s framework for tribal civil jurisdiction potentially
hinders strong state interests.164 Law enforcement interests are likely not
the only compelling state interests.165 States have a strong interest in carrying out their constitutional duties, such as collecting taxes from nonmembers, asserting criminal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmember
crimes occurring on tribal land, and providing education to children, as
was the case in Reeves.166 Nevertheless, under the Reeves framework, con159. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383 (explaining lack of notice to nonmembers regarding jurisdiction they may fall under while traveling through reservations).
160. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 787 (noting the irregular pattern of federal,
state, and tribal jurisdiction within boundaries of tribal reservations); cf. Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442–43 (1997) (illustrating facts of case).
161. Compare MacArthur v. San Juan Cty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1069–70 (10th Cir.
2007) (applying Montana framework when nonmember conduct arises on tribal
land), with Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Herman, 786 F.3d 653, 659–62 (8th Cir.
2015) (stating Montana framework is the appropriate analysis when nonmember
conduct arises on tribal land).
162. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 906 (stating landownership status determinative of
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct).
163. See id. (holding landownership indicative of tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmember conduct arising on tribal land); see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383–85 (indicating potential risks to nonmembers when haled into tribal court). See generally
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 822 (discussing due process disadvantage nonmembers
potentially face in tribal courts)
164. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 914 (Christen, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
majority erred in failing to recognize Arizona’s compelling state interest in fulfilling constitutional duty to educate children). The dissent argued that permitting
tribal jurisdiction over nonmember school districts may adversely impact the vital
state interest of providing public education by subjecting school districts to adjudication in Navajo tribal court under Navajo tribal law. See id. at 916–17.
165. See id. at 919 (arguing that Arizona possessed compelling state interest in
providing public education to children residing on reservations).
166. Compare Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362–63 (majority opinion) (explaining that
when strong state interests are present, state interests typically preempt tribal interest in self-government), with Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980) (holding that states may compel tribes to collect
state sales taxes from nonmembers on behalf of state due to strong state interest in
collecting taxes). See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
208 (1978) (declaring that tribes lack any criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
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cerns beyond law enforcement interests will not invoke the strong presumption against tribal jurisdiction from Montana.167 States will likely
have to expend taxpayer money and resources in tribal court and exhaust
all tribal remedies before they can seek relief in federal court.168 Thus,
compelling state interests will have to languish in tribal court, and their
relative weight will likely be determined by tribal law, not state law.169
Another potential victim of the Ninth Circuit’s new framework is the
tribe itself, which may see a loss in nonmember investment and an inability to assert civil jurisdiction over sophisticated nonmembers.170 Tribes in
the United States are economically depressed, due to a lack of nonmember business investments on tribal land.171 Nonmembers normally choose
not to invest on tribal reservations out of a fear of being hailed into tribal
court.172 Previously, under Montana, there was a general presumption
against tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.173 However, Reeves proposed the opposite presumption in favor of tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmember conduct that occurred on tribal land.174 Unfortunately, this
new framework will further discourage investment by nonmembers on resconduct occurring within boundaries of reservation); Reeves, 861 F.3d at 919 (arguing that Arizona possessed compelling state interest in providing public education
to children residing on reservations). But see Reeves, 861 F.3d at 898–99 (majority
opinion) (declaring state law enforcement interest as only compelling interest warranting Montana analysis according to Hicks).
167. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 919 (Christen, J., dissenting) (refusing to recognize other compelling state interests that would trigger Hicks’s holding until Supreme Court states otherwise).
168. See Cave, supra note 20 (explaining that litigating with Indians is especially expensive and time consuming because, under Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine,
litigants typically must litigate in tribal court system and then, after exhausting all
remedies in tribal courts, have to go through separate appeal process in federal
court system).
169. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 916–17 (explaining that issue implicating state interest must now be determined by tribal court applying tribal law); see also Hicks,
533 U.S. at 382–85 (Souter, J., concurring) (outlining potential adverse risks of
nonmember having to defend in tribal court).
170. Compare Koppisch, supra note 13 (describing how nonmember business
owners currently avoid tribal civil jurisdiction), with Krogstad, supra note 12 (discussing extent of tribal poverty on reservations in United States).
171. See Koppisch, supra note 13 (noting that nonmembers typically do not
open businesses on reservations and tribal members must leave reservations for
work).
172. See id. (nonmembers forgo business investments on tribal reservations
fearing being hailed into tribal court); see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 382–85 (outlining
adverse obstacles nonmembers may face in tribal court).
173. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358–59 (majority opinion) (stating general presumption against tribal sovereignty extending to nonmembers); see also Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008) (noting
presumption that tribes generally lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers within
boundaries of reservation); Reeves, 861 F.3d at 907 (Christen, J., dissenting) (explaining general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers).
174. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 906 (announcing general presumption that tribes
can exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on tribal land, absent state law enforcement interests). Contra Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358–59 (acknowl-
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ervations because it increases the likelihood a tribal court can assert jurisdiction over a suit involving a nonmember.175 Moreover, sophisticated
nonmember businesses will likely attempt to operate off Indian-owned
land while using agents or distributors on tribal land to avoid being hailed
into tribal court.176
B. Striking Gold: A Better Claim for Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmember
Conduct on Tribal Land
Congress should permit federal review of tribal court cases involving
nonmembers.177 This change would strike a balance between the interests of the states, the tribes, and nonmembers.178 By granting federal
courts the power to review cases filed in tribal courts against nonmembers,
federal courts can ensure that tribal courts do not infringe on the personal
liberties of nonmembers as guaranteed under the United States Constitution.179 This will incentivize tribal courts to protect nonmember’s liberties, to avoid reversal in federal court.180 Compelling state interests will be
edging general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember
conduct).
175. See Koppisch, supra note 13 (discussing nonmembers’ fears of doing business within tribal reservations due to fears of being subject to tribal court jurisdiction); cf. Miller, supra note 13 (summarizing economic conditions on tribal
reservations). Koppisch argues that the risks of operating a private business are
too high for even tribal members. See Koppisch, supra note 13; cf. Reeves, 861 F.3d
at 900 (declaring general presumption that tribes can exercise civil jurisdiction
over nonmember conduct arising on tribal land).
176. Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893–94 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing how sophisticated foreign manufacturer successfully and intentionally avoided state jurisdiction under federal personal jurisdiction doctrine which utilizes balancing test incorporating reasonableness and
fairness principles).
177. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 830–31 (discussing author’s proposed
framework for federal court review of certain aspects of nonmember cases brought
in tribal court). Compare Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining
lack of federal review or removal mechanism), with Iowa Mutual Ins. v. LaPlant,
480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (explaining Congress “has never expressed any intent to
limit the civil jurisdiction of the tribal courts”).
178. See Florey, supra note 22, at 1542 (discussing how both tribes and nonmembers would benefit with application of federal personal jurisdiction framework to issue of whether tribal civil jurisdiction can or should extend to
nonmember conduct arising within boundaries of reservation).
179. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383–85 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating lack of constitutional checks and Supreme Court oversight as a concern that tribal courts will
infringe on personal liberties of nonmembers); see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at
821–22 (discussing lack of constitutional protections afforded to nonmembers in
tribal court).
180. See Fletcher, supra note 2, 836–38 (explaining how federal court review
can ensure nonmembers’ due process rights); see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (explaining power of federal court review over lower courts).
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taken into account in federal courts, while nonmember business owners’
fear of unfair treatment may be allayed.181
Next, the Supreme Court should extend the federal courts’ personal
jurisdiction analysis to also determine whether tribes could fairly assert
jurisdiction over nonmembers.182 The federal court personal jurisdiction
framework is suitable for tribal jurisdiction analyses because it takes into
account the reasonableness of hailing a defendant into a foreign court.183
The analysis would be based on: (1) the nonmember’s contacts with the
tribal forum; (2) whether nonmembers have “purposefully availed” themselves of the “benefits and protections” of the tribe; and (3) whether asserting tribal jurisdiction over the nonmember offends the “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”184
Using the previous example from above, the family involved in the car
crash could not be hailed into tribal court unless the tribal court determined that it was fair and reasonable to do so under the balancing test
required by the federal court personal jurisdiction framework.185 If the
family felt that the tribal court incorrectly asserted jurisdiction over them,
then they could try to remove the case to federal court or appeal it to
federal court.186 Tribes may feel as though this new framework infringes
on its sovereignty or undermines its right to self-government.187 Never181. Compare Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 861, 914
(9th Cir. 2017) (Christen, J., dissenting) (asserting application of tribal law in tribal court to issue concerning compelling state interest is detrimental to the state),
amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14253 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 648 (2018), with Florey, supra note 22, at 1542 (explaining benefits of extending federal personal jurisdiction doctrine to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember analysis).
182. See Florey, supra note 22, at 1507–08, 1542, 1556 (advocating adoption of
federal personal jurisdiction doctrine to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers).
183. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113–14
(1987) (determining that even if defendant meets minimum contacts standard,
personal jurisdiction may still be defeated if court determines it would be unreasonable for the defendant to defend itself in a foreign forum).
184. See id. at 113–14 (outlining reasonableness standard in federal personal
jurisdiction doctrine); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985) (explaining that defendant must “purposefully avail[ ] itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(requiring defendants to possess minimum level of contacts with foreign jurisdiction such that the foreign court’s assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction is fair);
Florey, supra note 22, at 1511–13 (outlining federal personal jurisdiction
framework).
185. See Florey, supra note 22, at 1555–57 (applying federal personal jurisdiction doctrine to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmember).
186. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)
(explaining power of federal court review over lower courts and how it results in
“statutory [uniformity]”).
187. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 517 (1832) (affirming tribes’ right
to self-government); see also Fletcher, supra note 3, 1003–04 (discussing how tribal
governments have resisted federal court doctrines via tribal constitutions that directly contradict federal court doctrines).
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theless, this compromise will allow tribal courts to assert civil jurisdiction
over nonmember conduct occurring on tribal land, encourage nonmember investment on the reservation, and make it more difficult for sophisticated nonmembers to avoid tribal court.188
V. CONCLUSION: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
DECISION IN REEVES AFTER THE TUMBLEWEEDS SETTLE
The Reeves majority’s new framework for analyzing whether tribes may
assert civil jurisdiction over nonmember conduct arising on Indian-owned
land will discourage nonmembers from investing on reservation lands and
will act as persuasive authority for other circuits to adopt the Reeves framework.189 In order to avoid potentially prejudicial tribal courts, nonmembers will likely adjust their behavior in light of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.190 This may cause nonmember businesses and state facilities to
relocate outside of the reservation thus decreasing economic opportunity
on the reservation.191 This issue is and has been ripe for more than a
decade for the Supreme Court to intervene, or even for Congress to address legislatively.192 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Reeves
will add to the confusion of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers
188. See Royster, supra note 8, at 890–91 (discussing confusion over when
tribes may assert jurisdiction over nonmember activity arising on tribal land). Compare Florey, supra note 22, at 1542 (explaining benefits of adopting federal personal jurisdiction would be (1) clear delineation of powers of tribal courts and (2)
ability to provide protections consistent with what nonmembers might except from
a court), with Miller, supra note 13 (explaining why nonmembers choose to avoid
opening businesses on tribal land).
189. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 906 (finding
ownership status of land dispositive for tribal civil jurisdiction in absence of state
law enforcement interests), amended by 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14253 (9th Cir. Aug.
3, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018); see also Koppisch, supra note 13 (discussing nonmembers’ fear of investing on tribal land and tribal members who suffer
economically because of this lack of investment); cf. Royster, supra note 8, at
909–10 (explaining that the uncertainty of Hicks created a risk for tribal courts that
Montana may be more widely applied and expressing concern this could erode
tribal sovereignty).
190. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 382–85 (detailing lack of constitutional oversight
over tribal courts); Koppisch, supra note 13 (discussing that nonmembers avoid
making business investments within tribal reservations for fear of falling under tribal court jurisdiction). See generally Fletcher, supra note 2, at 822, 827; Westeson,
supra note 7 (illustrating basis for nonmembers’ fear of adverse tribal court
judgments).
191. See Krogstad, supra note 12 (describing severe economic depression on
reservations); see also Miller, supra note 13 (stating nonmember aversion to investing in tribal land contributes to economic depression on reservations and fact that
tribe members must travel far from reservations for work).
192. See Royster, supra note 8, at 890–91 (examining confusion Hicks caused
as to what extent tribes may exercise tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct
occurring on tribal land since 2001).
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and hopefully pressure the Supreme Court to finally put this issue to
rest.193
193. See Reeves, 861 F.3d at 917–18 (Christen, J., dissenting) (noting that majority created new circuit split and that new framework will have negative consequences); see also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 382–85 (explaining concerns and negative
effects nonmembers face in tribal courts).
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